The Paris Principles are now taken as ‘the definitive and most widely accepted benchmark against which national human rights institutions (NHRIs) are assessed’ at domestic, regional and international levels.^[1] Nevertheless, as I explore in this article, they are neither sufficient nor the exclusive model in evaluating NHRIs and their performance.

In this article, I first explain what an NHRI is, then define the effectiveness of NHRIs, and finally discuss various approaches to assessing NHRIs. They include the structural approach, the mandate-based approach, the performance measurement approach, and the public legitimacy approach.

What is an NHRI?

There have been debates among scholars around the definition of an NHRI^[2] and one of the major disagreements is on whether NHRIs should include those that meet some but not all of the requirements of the Paris Principles.^[3] Though the United Nations has recognised the Principles as a minimum standard for establishing NHRIs and permitting their participation in UN and regional meetings,^[4] the text of the principles does not offer an explicit definition of an NHRI. It only refers to the basic principle that it ‘shall be vested with competence to promote and protect human rights’.^[5] According to a United Nations NHRI Handbook, an NHRI refers to ‘a body which is established by a government under the constitution, or by law or decree, the functions of which are specifically designed in terms of the promotion and protection of human rights’.^[6] Put simply, NHRIs are ‘administrative bodies responsible for promoting and protecting human rights domestically’.^[7]

NHRIs occupy a unique position between the international community, government, and civil society, which allows them to play a key role in promoting and protecting human rights. As they are statutory bodies set up under the law or constitution and are usually state-funded, they have ‘a different status in the community and different tools at their disposal to hold the state and other bodies accountable’, for example, access to information and close engagement with government officials that NGOs may not have, and thus serve as ‘practical link between the governing and the governed’^[8] In addition, NHRIs serve a key function to bridge the gap between norms in international human rights laws and domestic implementation,^[9] as Paris Principle compliant NHRIs can participate in UN and regional meetings to share information and formulate recommendations strategically.^[10]

The Paris Principles do not specify the model or structures of NHRIs, but the UN General Assembly, when endorsing the Principles, recognised the rights of each state ‘to choose the framework that is best suited to its particular needs at the national level’.^[11] A great variety of institutional structures of NHRIs have evolved across geographic regions and legal traditions.^[12] The UN HNRI Handbook identifies two broad categories of NHRIs, namely human rights commissions and ombudsmen.^[13] While the former is a body with an express mandate for the protection and promotion of human rights and is composed of members who should have human rights expertise, a classical ombudsman organisation is a single-member institution that monitors the conduct of public administration.^[14] Nevertheless, another UN report identifies six models of NHRIs in addition to the two. The additional ones are “hybrid institutions”, “consultative and advisory bodies”, “institutes and bodies” and “multiple institutions”.^[15] Although the UN recognises multiple institutions or thematic institutions, such as those working on women’s rights or racial equality, as NHRIs, it maintained that a single and consolidated Paris Principles-compliant NHRI is the most effective model.^[16]

Defining Effectiveness

Despite the vast literature on NHRIs and their effectiveness, scholars and researchers have difficulties agreeing on what effectiveness for NHRIs means.^[17] As NHRIs follow various models and operate in differing contexts and circumstances, it is difficult to have a single definition of effectiveness applied to all.^[18] While the SCA and much literature refer to effectiveness as compliance with the Paris Principles, which focus on institutional design and mandate, others look at parameters such as performance, legitimacy and accountability.

In this paper, effectiveness is defined as the extent to which an NHRI promotes and protects human rights,^[19] which is the key responsibility of NHRIs in the Paris Principle. Also, since the Paris Principles do not specify to whom NHRIs are accountable, and NHRIs work with a long list of stakeholders that might have competing interests,^[20] it is crucial to define effectiveness as that for the public and, in particular, those suffering from human rights violations^[21] whose rights an NHRI are mandated to protect.^[22]

While the definition seems straightforward, operationalising it is not. What exactly is measured? Against what standards should NHRIs be assessed? Whose activities are reviewed? Many more questions can be asked when expanding the definition. However, it is certain that the effectiveness of an NHRI highly depends on various internal and external factors, and so does the measurement of its effectiveness. Reif contends that all legal, political, financial and social factors, which may sometimes be interrelated, must attain a satisfactory level for an NHRI to be effective.^[23] The institutional design of an NHRI must take into account the various factors in the domestic context to be effective.^[24] In addition, due to NHRIs’ nature as advisory bodies, effectiveness is unavoidably dependent on how other parties, such as the government, are able and willing to implement the recommendations.^[25] As such, measuring effectiveness should not solely assess the work of the NHRIs. As Goodman and Pegram pointed out, a lack of compliance with NHRI recommendations may be the failure of other actors to fulfil their accountability function rather than the NHRI being ineffective.^[26] Also, in order to be more objective, evaluation should be done over a long time frame but not on a short-term basis^[27] because NHRIs require time to overcome both internal and external obstacles to effectively fulfil their mandate, especially those in democratising states.

Despite the challenges, the international community and scholars have tried to discern commonalities of effective NHRIs. The UN NHRI handbook determined six ‘effectiveness factors’, which are (1) independence, (2) defined jurisdiction and adequate power, (3) accessibility, (4) cooperation, (5) operational efficiency and (6) accountability.^[28] On the other hand, scholars have tried to identify some benchmarks and indicators which are often linked to the Paris Principles. In a 2005 report, Carver identified 16 benchmarks in three areas of concern, namely (1) the character of the institution, (2) mandate and (3) public accountability.^[29] He held that the benchmarks reflect minimum standards set out in the Paris Principles and are minimum conditions for NHRIs to protect and promote human rights.^[30] Livingstone and Murray expanded the Paris Principles and established a list of criteria and factors in three categories for evaluating the effectiveness of NHRIs. The three categories are:^[31]

1. Capacity:                 the NHRIs’ powers, resources, composition and the context within which it operates
2. Performance:        how an NHRI exercises the power given to it
3. Legitimacy:            the NHRIs’ standing and relationships

Many of the factors and benchmarks identified by the UN and scholars discussed above share similar themes despite different terminologies. It can be observed that many of them, especially those expanded from the Paris Principles, focus on the institutional designs or the formal structure of NHRIs, while some others describe the activities taken by the NHRIs and the subsequent outcomes as well as their relationship with other stakeholders. For instance, many from ‘the character of institution’ category in Carver’s report and the ‘capacity’ category in Murray and Livingstones address the formal and structural requirements of NHRIs, e.g. independence and legal status of the institution. These observations reflect the few key approaches to evaluating NHRIs, namely the structural approach, the mandate-based approach, the performance measurement approach and the public legitimacy approach, which will be discussed in the following.

The Structural Approach

The Paris Principles are not legally binding and only have a soft law status. However, it has been adopted by the UN, regional bodies and civil society as the standards for establishing and strengthening NHRIs.^[32] They are also recognised as ‘the minimal international standards’ and ‘a broad normative framework for the status, structure, mandate, composition, power and methods of operation of the principal domestic human mechanism’.^[33]

As a dominant evaluative approach adopted by scholars and civil society, ‘the structural approach’ assesses the effectiveness of NHRIs based on their compliance with the Paris Principles and focuses primarily on structural issues.^[34] It sees changes in formal rules as signs of progress.^[35] The basic assumption of this approach is that, as institutional design determines the rules of the game,^[36] compliance with the Paris Principles will likely increase the responsiveness and effectiveness of NHRIs. Linos and Pegram’s mixed-mode study supported the assumption. They conducted quantitative analyses with a database of NHRIs in 107 countries and found that NHRIs with formal safeguards (including those guaranteeing independence and specifying the power and responsibilities of NHRIs) are more effective in both democratic and authoritarian states.^[37] They explained that formal mandates, which are usually stable over time, empower NHRIs, and thus allow them to build both internal and external coalitions and positive feedback cycles.^[38]

In practice, the SCA of the GANHRI adopts this structural approach and awards A-status to NHRIs that fully comply with the Paris Principles.^[39] While this peer-review  procedure, by assessing NHRI’s compliance with the Principles, has given the Principles ‘sustained political weight and credibility’,^[40] the SCA also issued General Observations (GOs), which give further depth and clarity to the Principles.  The GOs are ‘authoritative, interpretative states that assist in understanding and implementing the Paris Principles’^[41] and are used in conjunction with the Principles in the accreditation procedure.^[42]

The GOs are designed to be applied to NHRIs with different structural models and are categorised into two parts, i.e., ‘essential requirements of the Paris Principles’ and ‘practices that directly promote Paris Principles compliance’.^[43] The GOs include:

 

1. Essential requirements of the Paris Principles
1.1	The establishment of NHRIs
1.2	Human rights mandate
1.3	Encouraging ratification or accession to international human rights instruments
1.4	Interaction with the international human rights system
1.5	Cooperation with other human rights bodies
1.6	Recommendations by NHRIs
1.7	Ensuring pluralism of the NHRI
1.8	Selection and appointment of the decision-making body of NHRIs
1.9	Political representatives on NHRIs
1.10	Adequate funding of NHRIs
1.11	Annual reports of NHRIs
2. Practices that directly promote Paris Principles compliance
2.1	Guarantee of tenure for members of the NHRI decision-making body
2.2	Full-time members of an NHRI
2.3	Protection from criminal and civil liability for official actions and decisions undertaken in good faith
2.4	Recruitment and retention of NHRI staff
2.5	NHRIs during the situation of a coup d’état or a state of emergency
2.6	Limitation of power of NHRIs due to national security
2.7	Administrative regulation of NHRIs
2.8	Assessing NHRIs as National Preventive and National Monitoring Mechanisms
2.9	The quasi-judicial competency of NHRIs (complaints-handling)

 

The Paris Principles were originally the conclusion of a workshop held in Paris by the UN Commission on Human Rights to review patterns of cooperation between national and international institutions and to discuss ways of enhancing their effectiveness.^[44] They enjoy substantial legitimacy because they were drafted by NHRIs themselves, and this provides strong reasons against reopening them to revision which may attract influence by states.^[45] Since the GANHRI is also a body formed by NHRIs, it seems plausible and legitimate to use standards set by NHRIs themselves, i.e. the Paris Principles and the GOs, to evaluate them.

Nevertheless, both the Paris Principles per se and the structural approach have received criticisms from scholars since compliance with the Principles is not a complete indication of NHRIs’ effectiveness.^[46] The Principles are ‘effectiveness factors’ but don’t measure effectiveness per se,^[47] and, in other words, they do not focus on how NHRIs perform or are perceived by others.^[48] The structural approach is limited, because, as Mertus pointed out, robust institutional design is important only ‘to the degree to which formal rules and procedures affect outcomes.’^[49] In fact, many Paris Principles compliant NHRIs were not particularly effective^[50] while some achieved considerable results without complying with the Principles.^[51]

More importantly, the Paris Principles suffer from some inherent weaknesses as being vague and incomplete. During the three-day workshop in 1991, the participants did not expect to come up with such an important document and many states chose not to participate.^[52] The Principles were drafted under extreme time pressure and without ‘a formal diplomatic process’ and ‘the requisite support and expertise’, resulting in some significant mistakes such as the failure to take into account features of the Latin-American ombudsmen model. In terms of the text, some contended that it lacks guidance on the quasi-jurisdictional competence and the standards for achievement,^[53] as well as other issues, including how NHRIs respond to crisis situations,^[54] how they can be used by others and how much attention they pay to the most vulnerable groups.^[55]  Relying on the Principles will unavoidably omit many important angles and issues. Okafor also argues that relying too much on legalism, the Principles assigned ‘too central a role to its ‘court-like function and features’ and failed to ensure an adequate focus on the educational and advisory functions.^[56]

It is clear that while the structural approach and the Paris Principles are a good starting point, assessing NHRIs’ effectiveness should go beyond the formal rules and simply relying on the Principles.

The Mandate-based Approach

The mandate-based approach evaluates the effectiveness of an NHRI based on ‘its ability to fulfil its formal substantive mandate.’^[57] In other words, an NHRI is effective when it has high efficiency or efficacy in achieving its functions delineated in the legislative text, which may differ from the Paris Principles. This approach is more direct and is favoured by the states. While some scholars have also adopted this approach,^[58] human rights advocates may see significant limitations in it.

Though in some cases the terms of the mandate are agreed by the states after consulting civil society and other stakeholders, the breath of the mandate is essentially the discretion of the state. Very often, they are largely determined by the context and the ‘historical relationship between individuals and the state.’^[59] When an NHRI is given limited mandates, the evaluation will also consider only the achievements within its remit, but not a broader human rights agenda. States prefer this approach since it only demands the NHRI to move along its agenda, which can be based on a sub-standard mandate or have no actual effect on promoting human rights.^[60] In reality, while some states created weak NHRIs to appease the internal community,^[61] some NHRIs act as a rubber stamp for non-compliance of the state, distract from serious human rights issues and diminish the role of civil society.^[62] Relying on the agenda defined by the states, the approach may also conceal the negative or perverse effects of an NHRI’s work.^[63]

If effectiveness is defined as the extent to which an NHRI promotes and protects human rights for the public, this approach is doubtlessly insufficient if not misleading.

The Performance Measurement Approach

The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights wrote:

Assessing NHRIs’ effectiveness beyond the formal and structural requirements (related to their compliance with the Paris Principles) means assessing their influence on the human rights situation in their respective countries. Measuring this impact is necessary to assess NHRIs’ effectiveness and whether they address the most urgent and important human rights issues.^[64] (emphasis added)

Rather than assessing the institutional design of the NHRIs or how well they fulfil their core purposes, the performance measurement approach evaluates the activities, outputs and outcomes of NHRIs. A key question of this approach is to what extent the human rights conditions of a state have improved since the operation of an NHRI.^[65] However, the approach requires defining a proper standard for measuring an NHRI’s impact,^[66] which can be challenging. For example, in a country with a deteriorating human rights situation, it may be easily concluded that the NHRI is ineffective. However, the NHRI may have performed its duties, but the other actors and institutions in the state failed to react to or complement the NHRI’s work. Thus, setting an appropriate benchmark for this approach requires ‘recognising that the role and responsibility of an NHRI is limited to its sphere of influence and activities’ and specifying where the boundaries lie.^[67] This does not mean following the mandate-based approach and assessing an NHRI against its mandates but acknowledging it is not the only institution in the society influencing the human rights condition. Having said that, when the overall human rights situation in a country improves, it is also difficult to attribute it to the efforts of the NHRI solely.

When adopting the approach, one has to distinguish ‘output’ from ‘outcomes.’^[68] Versteeg defines ‘output’ as ‘the immediate product of a human rights commission’s work’, e.g. case opened and closed, meeting held, people trained, reports published, and ‘outcome’ as the results that matter, such as ‘more equal opportunity and heightened mutual respect.’^[69] Additionally, Carver suggested another level of indicator between the two, namely indicators of performance, which show how well the activities were carried out.^[70] While most NHRIs publish information and data about their output, outcomes are not often measured by themselves. Though proving causality is impossible when NHRIs are not the only actors, proof of causation is less important when the NHRIs can show that the outputs planned are produced and the desired outcomes have been achieved.^[71]

The Public Legitimacy Approach

A few researchers used public legitimacy as a measure of NHRI effectiveness. Public legitimacy is the belief that an NHRI’s operation can fulfil certain social expectations in a society.^[72] Different from formal legitimacy, which is the legal foundation of  NHRIs, public legitimacy is often discussed in the context of independence and accountability and is pivotal to the body’s credibility and reputation.^[73] Put simply, it assesses how an NHRI interacts with a broad range of stakeholders and the extent to which it is accountable to the public and fulfils the expectations of the public.

Pegram argues that accountability, which is the ability of an NHRI ‘to enter into alliances with actors in a range of dimensions, is important in explaining NHRI effectiveness.^[74] The more capable an NHRI is in securing allies, the more powerful it is in protecting human rights.

Cardenas assesses NHRIs as accountability institutions that create a social space for public deliberation over wrongdoings in three stages, including documentation, remediation and prevention.^[75] An effective accountability institution allows social actors to confront public authorities and hold them accountable. To do so, an NHRI has to promote full access to all members of society, including individuals and civil society.

Okafor evaluated the performance of South African, Ugandan and Nigerian NHRIs using three main ‘popular legitimisation factors’, which are ‘the absence of excessive legalism’, ‘sufficient attention to popular agency’ and ‘the depth of an NHRI’s connections to the voices of suffering.’ The first criterion asked to what extent ‘an NHRI assigns too central a role to its “court-like” functions and features in its organisational framework.’^[76] The second is about ‘the extent to which an NHRI shows its understanding that its value should not be limited to what it can do for civil society, but includes to a significant extent what these other agents are (with the NHRI’s help) able to do with it.’^[77] The final criterion concerns the extent to which the legal framework and operations of an NHRI connect to the ‘voices of suffering’, who are the most vulnerable in society and require the greatest protection.^[78] The logic of his approach is that the more public legitimacy an NHRI enjoys, the more credibility it receives, and the more augmenting capacity to persuade and pressure the government and power actors, resulting in higher effectiveness.^[79] Therefore, it is important for an NHRI not to focus too much on rules already performed by the courts, to maintain good relationships with civil society and be used by them, and to pay extra attention to the vulnerable in society. These will help provide an NHRI with higher public legitimacy and thus greater effectiveness.

Conclusion

This chapter examined the contested concept of the effectiveness of NHRIs and defined effectiveness as the extent to which an NHRI promotes and protects human rights for the public and those suffering from human rights violations. It also explored a few major approaches to evaluate NHRI effectiveness, which are the structural approach, the mandate-based approach, the performance measurement approach and the public legitimacy approach. In summary, these approaches ask the following questions when assessing NHRIs’ performance.

Approach	Key Questions
The Structural Approach	●      To what extent does the institutional design of the NHRI comply with the Paris Principles? ●      Is the NHRI provided with sufficient formal safeguards that guarantee its independence and given a broad mandate to promote and protect human rights?
The Mandate-based Approach	●      To what extent has the NHRI fulfilled its mandate provided in the legislative text under which it is established?
The Performance Measurement Approach	●      To what extent has the operation of the NHRI improved the human rights conditions of the state? ●      To what extent is the development in the human rights situation attributable to the efforts of the NHRI? ●      Would the human rights conditions have been worse without the NHRI?
The Public Legitimacy Approach	●      How does the NHRI interact with different stakeholders? How do the stakeholders perceive the NHRI? ●      How accessible is the NHRI? To what extent have the civil society and individuals utilised the NHRI to protect and promote human rights? ●      To what extent does the NHRI connect to the ‘voices of suffering’?

These approaches reflect different conceptions of an effective NHRI and demonstrate that no single approach can provide a thorough and comprehensive analysis of NHRIs’ performances.

^[1] Gauthier De Beco and Rachel Murray, A commentary on the Paris Principles on national human rights institutions (Cambridge University Press 2015) 20

^[2] Linda C. Reif, ‘The Shifting Boundaries of NHRI Definition in the International System’ in Ryan Goodman and Thomas Pegram (eds), Human Rights, State Compliance, and Social Change: Assessing National Human Rights Institutions (Cambridge University Press 2012)

^[3] Kirsten Roberts Lyer, ‘National Human Rights Institutions’ in Gerd Oberleitner (ed), International Human Rights Institutions, Tribunals, and Courts (Springer Singapore 2018) 293

^[4] For example, see United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) ‘Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 18 December 2019’ (23/01/2020)  A/RES/74/156; United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) ‘National institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights Report of the Secretary-General’ (29/07/2021)  A/76/246 Para 102

^[5] United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) ‘Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly 48/134 National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights’ (1993)  UNGA Res 48/134 , Art 1

^[6] United Nations, A Handbook on the Establishment and Strengthening of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (1995) 6

^[7] Sonia Cardenas, Chains of Justice : The Global Rise of State Institutions for Human Rights (University of Pennsylvania Press 2014) 2

^[8] Anne Smith, ‘The Unique Position of National Human Rights Institutions: A Mixed Blessing?’ (2006) 28 Human Rights Quarterly 904, 908

^[9] The Paris Principles, Art 3(b); Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI), General Observations of the Sub-Committee on Accreditation (2018) 1; Julie Mertus, Human rights matters : local politics and national human rights institutions (Stanford University Press 2009) 3

^[10] Katrien Meuwissen, ‘Fundamental rights protection beyond individual complaints: The potential of national human rights institutions in Europe’ in Lorenza Violini and Antonia  Baraggia (eds), The Fragmented Landscape of Fundamental Rights Protection in Europe: The Role of Judicial and Non-Judicial Actors (2018) 164

^[11] The Paris Principles, Para 12

^[12] United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Professional Training Series No.4: National Human Rights Institutions: History, Principles, Roles and Responsibilities (2010) 15

^[13] United Nations 7

^[14] Linda C. Reif, ‘Building Democratic Institutions: The Role of National Human Rights Institutions in Good Governance and Human Rights Protection’ (2000) 13 Harvard Human Rights Journal 1, 8-10

^[15] United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 16

^[16] Ibid

^[17] Emma Palmer, ‘The effectiveness of National Human Rights Institutions’ relationships with civil society: the Commission on Human Rights in the Philippines’ (2019) 25 Australian Journal of Human Rights 299, 301; Ryan Goodman and Thomas Pegram, ‘Introduction: National Human Rights Institutions, State Conformity, and Social Change’ in Ryan Goodman and Thomas Pegram (eds), Human Rights, State Compliance, and Social Change: Assessing National Human Rights Institutions (Cambridge University Press 2012) 9

^[18] Stephen Livingstone and Rachel Murray, ‘The Effectiveness of National Human Rights Institutions’ in Simon Halliday and Patrick D. Schmidt (eds), Human rights brought home : socio-legal perspectives on human rights in the national context (Hart 2004) 140

^[19] Cardenas emphasised the need to assess both the regulative (or protective) and constitutive (promotional) effects of NHRIs. See Sonia Cardenas, ‘National Human Rights Institutions and State Compliance’ in Ryan Goodman and Thomas Pegram (eds), Human Rights, State Compliance, and Social Change: Assessing National Human Rights Institutions (Cambridge University Press 2012) 39

^[20] Cardenas, Chains of Justice : The Global Rise of State Institutions for Human Rights 141

^[21] Obiora Chinedu Okafor and Shedrack C. Agbakwa, ‘On Legalism, Popular Agency and “Voices of Suffering”: The Nigerian National Human Rights Commission in Context’ (2002) 24 Human Rights Quarterly 662, 693

^[22] United Nations 17

^[23] Reif, ‘Building Democratic Institutions: The Role of National Human Rights Institutions in Good Governance and Human Rights Protection’ 23

^[24] United Nations 10

^[25] Ken Marijtje Prahari Setiawan, ‘Promoting Human Rights: National Human Rights Commissions in Indonesia and Malaysia ’ (Doctoral Thesis, Leiden University 2013) 24

^[26] Goodman and Pegram 15

^[27] Reif, ‘Building Democratic Institutions: The Role of National Human Rights Institutions in Good Governance and Human Rights Protection’ 23

^[28] United Nations 10

^[29] Richard Carver, Assessing the Effectiveness of National Human Rights Institutions (International Council on Human Rights Policy 2005) 11

^[30] Ibid

^[31] Livingstone and Murray 141; Rachel Murray, ‘National Human Rights Institutions. Criteria and Factors for Assessing Their Effectiveness’ (2007) 25 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 189

^[32] For example, see Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) ‘General Comment No. 2 (2002) The role of independent national human rights institutions in the promotion and protection of the rights of the child’ (15/11/2002)  CRC/GC/2002/2; Human Rights Council ‘Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council on 28 September 2018’ (8/10/2018)  A/HRC/RES/39/17; Council of Europe, Recommendation No. R (97) 14 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the establishment of independent national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights (1997)

^[33] Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI) Para 1

^[34] Julie Mertus, ‘Evaluating NHRIs: Considering Structure, Mandate, and Impact’ in Ryan Goodman and Thomas Pegram (eds), Human Rights, State Compliance, and Social Change: Assessing National Human Rights Institutions (Cambridge University Press 2012) 76

^[35] Ibid

^[36] Katerina Linos and Thomas Pegram, Interrogating Form and Function: Designing Effective National Human Rights Institutions (Matters Of Concern Human Rights Research Paper Series No. 2015/8, The Danish Institute for Human Rights 2015); Thomas Pegram, ‘Accountability in Hostile Times: The Case of the Peruvian Human Rights Ombudsman 1996-2001’ (2008) 40 Journal of Latin American Studies 51, 56

^[37] Katerina Linos and Thomas Pegram, ‘What Works in Human Rights Institutions?’ (2017) 111 The American Journal of International Law 628

^[38] Ibid

^[39] Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI), A Practical Guide to The Work of The Sub-committee on Accreditation (SCA) (2017) 10

^[40] De Beco and Murray 12

^[41] Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI), A Practical Guide to The Work of The Sub-committee on Accreditation (SCA) 15

^[42] De Beco and Murray 10

^[43] Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI), General Observations of the Sub-Committee on Accreditation 2

^[44] Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) ‘Fact Sheet No.19, National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights’ (01/04/1993)

^[45] Goodman and Pegram 7

^[46] Mtendere Mute Gondwe, ‘Utilizing national human rights institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights: a case study of the Malawi Human Rights Commission’ (2019) 45 Commonwealth law bulletin 556, 557

^[47] Sanzhuan Guo, ‘Effectiveness of National Human Rights Institutions in International Human Rights Law: Problems and Prospects’ in B. S. Chimni, Miyoshi Masahiro and Thio Li-ann (eds), Asian Yearbook of International Law, Volume 14 (2008) (Brill 2011) 121

^[48] Murray 190; De Beco and Murray 23

^[49] Mertus, ‘Evaluating NHRIs: Considering Structure, Mandate, and Impact’ 80

^[50] For example, Human Rights Watch found that Benin’s NHRI had a strong mandate and suffered from no major structural impediments but was the least active in Africa. Lyer also found that NHRIs of Azerbaijan, Venezuela and Burundi were ineffective despite their A-statuses. See Human Rights Watch, Protectors or Pretenders: Government Human Rights Commissions in Africa (2001); Lyer 306

^[51] Carver 7

^[52] Katerina Linos and Thomas Pegram, ‘The Language of Compromise in International Agreements’ (2016) 70 International Organization 587, 598

^[53] C. Raj Kumar, ‘National Human Rights Institutions: Good Governance Perspectives on Institutionalization of Human Rights’ (2003) 19 American University International Law Review 259, 274

^[54] De Beco and Murray 139

^[55] Okafor and Agbakwa

^[56] Ibid

^[57] Mertus, ‘Evaluating NHRIs: Considering Structure, Mandate, and Impact’ 80

^[58] For example, John C. Mubangizi, ‘The role and effectiveness of national human rights institutions: lessons from selected African countries’ (2020) 46 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 519

^[59] Mertus, ‘Evaluating NHRIs: Considering Structure, Mandate, and Impact’ 80

^[60] Ibid

^[61] Sonia Cardenas, ‘National Human Rights Commissions in Asia’ (2002) 4 Human Rights Review 30, 42

^[62] Lyer 311

^[63] Cardenas, Chains of Justice : The Global Rise of State Institutions for Human Rights 316

^[64] European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Strong and effective national human rights institutions – challenges, promising practices and opportunities (2020) 66

^[65] Livingstone and Murray 140

^[66] Goodman and Pegram 14

^[67] Ibid

^[68] Setiawan 23

^[69] Mila Versteeg, ‘Performance Measures for Human Rights Commissions’ (Executive Session on Human Rights Commissions and Criminal Justice, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, August 2007) 5

^[70] Carver 33

^[71] Versteeg 5

^[72] Kumar 280

^[73] Smith 906

^[74] Pegram 53

^[75] Cardenas, Chains of Justice : The Global Rise of State Institutions for Human Rights 316

^[76] Obiora Chinedu Okafor, ‘National Human Rights Institutions in Anglophone Africa’ in Ryan Goodman and Thomas Pegram (eds), Human Rights, State Compliance, and Social Change: Assessing National Human Rights Institutions (Cambridge University Press 2012) 129

^[77] Ibid

^[78] Ibid

^[79]  ibid